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1GAMES MY PE INSTRUCTORS NEVER TAUGHT ME
George W. Ladd
March 1985
This essay addresses four questions —
1) Are Pareto Efficient outcomes desirable?
2) Are they efficient?
3) Is Pareto Efficiency a useful concept?
4) Is it useful for public policy study?
I will explore these issues by looking at effects of (a) differ
ences in persons' goals, (b) preferences for means used to attain goals,
(c) limiting resources, (d) externalities, (e) inter-personal compari
sons, (f) political contributions, (g) merit goods, (h) universal
hedonism, (i) sacred values, (j) concern for equity, (k) cardinality vs.
ordinality of utility and social welfare functions, and (^) theory of
second best. One's answers to these four questions depend upon one's
beliefs (i.e., one's perceptions of what is) and upon one's values
(i.e., conception of what ought to be).
The "PE" in the title means Pareto Efficient or Pareto Efficiency.
The first part of the paper uses box diagrams and simple mathematics to
investigate questions (1) through (4) in 2-dimensional situations. The
second part of the paper investigates these questions in multi-dimen
sional situations. The next part questions whether competitive outcomes
can be PE. The fourth part of the paper draws some inferences from
theory of second best concerning desirability, efficiency, and useful
ness of PE. The paper ends with a summary section.
Some people have incorporated risk into their studies of PE and
found limitations on PE in a risky world. This paper deals with a
simpler, risk-free world;
At numerous points in this paper I will want to compare two ratios,
which can be written ^*^1 ^ ^ ^2^* where ^
or MRS, Assuming and are non'zero,-
"l^^l ^ ^^1 and only if ^2
or a2 = ^2
I will continually use the phrases "We economists do this" or "we
do hot do that." This is a sort of a short-hand. Sometimes it will
mean "we all do this or do not do that." Sometimes it will mean "almost
all of us do or do not." I will also distinguish between "classical PE
conditions" and "PE conditions" or "PE outcomes." The former expression
means "conditions of a Pareto optimum under the traditional, (textbook)
assumptions," i.e., marginal rate of technical transformation equals
consumer's marginal rate of substitution everywhere. The last two
expressions mean "satisfying the Pareto requirement of making no one
worse off while making someone better off under the assumptions I am
making in this particular model" or "conditions that maximize the social
welfare function I am assuming in this model."
If anyone chooses to read this paper, be forewarned. I wrote this
paper for an audience of one—me**—to help me organize my thoughts and to
discover what I knew.
3a
TWO DIMENSIONAL SITUATIONS
This part of the paper investigates 2-dimensional situations by use
of box diagrams or simple optimization analysis.
If People Prefer Some Means
Over Others
I first show that satisfaction of classical PE conditions for effi
cient production by two single—product firms actually creates ineffi~
ciency if firms value means as well as ends.
Figure 1 presents the familiar Edgeworth Box diagram for
production. Firm 1 uses two inputs to produce output according to the
production function y^). Firm 2 uses two inputs to produce
output according to <^2 ~ amounts x and y of the two
resources are used: + x^ = x; + y2 curves labelled
are some of firm I's isoquants. The larger the value of i, the greater
the output. Curves labelled sre firm 2's isoquants. The larger the
value of j the greater the output. All points on curve PP^ are
efficient production points because no more of one good can be produced
without producing less of the other at any point on PP . Along
pp^
(1) MRTS^ =MRTS^
where MRTS^ represents marginal rate of technical substitution between
inputs x and y in firm k.
At any point on an isoquant of firm 1,
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Figure 1.
Firm 2
\
Firm 1
dq^ = 0 = + f^ydy^
where = 3qj^/9xj^. The slope of the isoquant is
(2) (dy^/dx^)^ = -
Now suppose that both firms are utility maximizers whose utility
depends on output and the amount of input y used. That is, input 2
produces 2 outputs: product and utility. Firm i maximizes U^If^^Cx^,
y^) » where 3U^/3y^ =marginal utility of y^ > 0.
Different points on the same isoquant now represent different
2 . 2
levels of utility. Consider, say, point Aon q^^. All points on q^
satisfy (1). What happens to the firm's iso-utility curve through A as
we move away from A? All points on the iso-utility curve satisfy
dU^ = OU^/3x^) dx^ + (9U^/3y^) dy^
From this we obtain as the slope
(3) (dyj/dx^)„ = -[fi^8U^/3qil/[fiyOUi/3qi) +
Ou^/3yj^)]
Comparison of (2) and (3) shows that the slope of the iso-utility curve
through point A can differ from the slope of the isoquant through that
point. Suppose that the iso-utility curve through A(curve u|) is
2 2 • • •steeper than curve qj^ and let represent a higher level of utility
than uj, Let be firm 2's iso-utility curve through point Aand let
represent a higher level of utility than U^. Point Ais on PP and
is therefore PE. Point Bis not on PP^ and is not PE. But notice that
firm 2 prefers, point B because it is on a higher.isorutility curve than
point A, and firm- 1 is indifferent between A and- B/-. Is PE .point 'A
better than non-Pareto point B? It depends on the criterion we.use.- As -
we move from B to A we get more product. But we achieve this only at
the expense of making firm 2 worse off according to its own values. '
Aren't points- A and-B. noncomparable according to Paretian cr.iteria? To
answer "Is PE desirable?" here we.need to use some higher level values
to compare desirability of B and A.
The line PP^ is referred to as the locus of points of efficient
production. This label is correct only if "production" is interpreted
narrowly. Points, on PP^ are points of efficient productibn'if inputs 1 '
and 2 are used only to produce product. But the firms use these 2
inputs to produce product and to produce utility.' PP is not a locus of
points of efficient production of product and of utility.
Figure 2 excludes one likely possibility. The shape of an iso-
utility curve depends on the effects of and y^ on output and on
utility. It is then possible that isoutility- curves are not everywhere
convex to the origin. It is possible that firm 2's isoutility curves
are nowhere tangent to firm I's iso-utility curves in the convex range
of the latter. Then there exist no PE points, if efficiency is defined
in terms of the firms' own objectives.
This argument shows that the classical PE'condition that calls for
each pair of firms to equate their MRT's in resource use creates ineffi-.
ciency if either fim values means as well as ends. This can also be
shown in various other ways. One way is to compare a situation in which
firm one maximizes its profit subject to a restriction on firm two's
profit with a situation in which firm one maximizes utility subject to a
restriction on firm two's utility. Comparison of Models. MI-1 and MI-2
is another.
Model MI-1
In this model, is fixed at and firm one maximizes output of
item one subject to restrictions on x and y. The Lagrangean is
L= + Aj(f^(x^,yj^) - qj + - q^)
+ li^Cx-x^-x^) + yy(y-yi-y2)
From manipulation of the first-order conditions (FOC), we obtain
3f^/3y^ 3f^/3y2
3fj^/3x^ Sf^/Sx^
Varying provides PP', At a PE point the two MRT are equal.
Model MI-2
Model MI-2 fixes U^Cq^jy^) at and maximizes U^(qj^,y^).
The Lagrangean is
L=Uj^(q^,y^) + A^(f^(x^,y^) - q^)
+ X^(f2(x2,y2) - q2^ "*• " ^2^
+ ^(x-x^-x^) + Viy(y-y^y2)^
Manipulation of the FOC yields
7a
au^/3y^ + _ IJy ^
^x
which can also be written
3f^/3y^ 3U^/3yj
•; .. "7^" \' . 'Sc ' _
3^2^ 5^2 _ ''y ':
\ : !
The SWF is not maximized by equating'the two MRT. Requiring either firm
to equate MRT to the exchange ratio y /p forces inefficiency upon that
* • y
firm.
We next show that the classical PE conditions for two-product firms
generates inefficiency if firms value means as well as ends. Let and
yj^ represent firm I's production of two goods and let and
represent firm 2's production. In Figure 2, AA' and BB^ are firm I's
and firm 2's transformation curves. At point P they are tangent;' this
/
is the Pareto-efficient point. But what happens if the firms enjoy
producing good x- '^or produce it for status purposes, but produce good y
only to make money. Suppose that lines AA'' and ^re the firms'
utility transformation 'curves. For each value of Xj^, AA' ' shows the
feasible value of y that maximizes firm I's utility. For a fixed
output of product 1 'of firm 1, the maxiioum amount of product 2 that the
firm can produce is on line AA',. But the amount that the firm prefers
to produce is on line AA''.. The firm is better off according to its own
values if it operates along AA' ' than if it operates along AA' .
similarly interpreted for firm'2, AA'' and B^B^ are nowhere-tangent to
7b
Figure 2,
Firm 2
Firm 1
each other. If we move the origin for firm 2 southeast to*bring A'' and
into tangency, total output of each product is less at this
tangency point than at P. ' This point of tangency is not PE, but each
firm produces more utility for itself at this point than at P« Here, as
in Figure 2, the PE point is efficient for production of goodsi but not
for production of goods and of utility.
Another way to compare the effect of firm objectives oh a two-
(
product firm is with models MI-3 and MI-4.
Model MI-3
The firm uses a single variable input to produce two products for
maximum profit. The Lagrangean is
I r • *
The FOC yield
3f-/3x_ p.
3fj^/3xj^ P2
The MRT equals the product price ratio.
Model MI-4
' r
The firm uses a variable input to produce two products for maximum
utility. The Lagrangean is
L= U(TT,q^) + - qj + " ^2^
+ + P2^2 " *2^ "
Manipulation of the FOC yields
3f^/3x2 Pj 9U/3qj^
3fj/3x^ " i^TWa^T
The MRT does not equal the product price ratio. A profit maximizing
firm equates its MRT to the reciprocal of the product price ratio. The
utility maximizing firm does not equate MRT to the reciprocal of the
price ratio. Forcing the utility-maximizing firm to equate MRT to the
price ratio generates inefficiency.
To compare effect of objective function on PE conditions for
consumers, we compare MI-5 and Ml-6.
Externalities
The next models show that satisfaction of classical PE conditions
generates inefficiency in the presence of externalities in consumption
or production.
Model MI-5
Each consumer's utility is affected by his own consumption. The
quantities of x and y are divided between two consumers to maximize one
consumer's utility while the other's is fixed. The Lagrangeari is
L=U^(x^,y^) + ~^2^
+ u^cx-xj^-x^) + Uy(y-yi-y2>
' The well-known PE conditions are
3Ui/3yi _ SU^/ay^
3U^/3x^ "
•10
The two consumer's MRS are equal.
.''Model .MI-6
Here the utility of consumer one is affected by consumer two's
level of consumption of y. The Lagrangean is
L=UjCx^.y^y^) + ^1(^2^X2,72)'- ^2)
+Vi3^(x-Xj-X2) +•yy(y-y]^-y2)
Here the FOC yield as the PE conditions the relations
3U^/9y^ Wy ' '
3U^/3x^ ~
The two consumer's MRS are not equal.
In summary, by comparing MI-1 with MI-2, MI-3 with MI-4, and MI-5
with MI--6, we see that a -firm or consumer that fails to equate MRS or
MRT to' the price ratio, i.e., fails to satisfy the classical PE condi
tions, is not operating inefficiently if its goal is different from the
one we attribute to it. If we promote a policy that meets the classical
PE conditions, we are forcing economic'agents who value means as well as
ends and consumers who value other persons' consumption'levels to
deviate from their own best interests.
9 . I •
Model MI-7
This is like MI-1 except that, the amount of y^ used affects qj^ and
q^. The term - replaced by (f j^(x^ ,yj^ iy2) - q^).
Manipulation of the FOC produces
11
9fl/9yi Py "*•
3f^/3Xj^
The presence of the externality—the effect of the use of input y by
firm two upon firm one's production—requires that firm two not equate
its MRT to firm one's MRT.
<
Scarce Resources
We can also show that the classical PE conditions prescribe ineffi
cient solutions if firms possess limiting quantities of fixed resources.
First take the situation of two single product firms.
Model MI-8
If either firm's use of inputs x and y is^ limited by its stock of a
third input, the classical PE condition that firms equate their MRT's
describes an inefficient outcome. This is shown in Models MI-8 and
MI-9.
Assume that each firm in MI-1 uses a third resource, which is fixed
in quantity at and limits the use of x and y. Then we add to the
Lagrangean of MI-1 the two terms
Now
Xi3fi/3yi - p^3G^/3y^ ~
X^9fj^/ax^ - p^3G^/3Xj " \ ~ ^2^V^^2 " P2^2^^^2
D. = 9a./9G.^ and p. ^ 0 if firm i is fully utilizing its fixed
lO 1
resource.
If, say, firm one is fully utilizing its fixed resource and Pj^ > 0
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but firm two. is not fully utilizing its fixed resource, the FOG call for
satisfying , , .
- p^3G^/3x^
I 1 j •- i' - ' .
We next show the effect of a limiting resource on a two-product
firm.
Model MI-9
This model is obtained from MI-3 by adding the constraint
k-a.q -a«q« > 0 where k is the total available amount of a limiting
' t', '
resource and a. is the amount of that resource used per unit of
output i. The Lagrangean is obtained by adding X2(k-aj^qj^-a2q2) to the
Lagrangean for Model MI-3. Manipulation of FOG yields .
3f^/3x^ S^2"*^2
Summary
For classical PE points to create inefficiencies it is not neces
sary for all firms to value some means as well as ends, for all firms to
face externalities, for all firms to have limiting resources, for all
firms to face different'input prices, and for all consumers to be
affected by other persons' levels of consumption. It is only necessary
for some firms to value means ais well as ends, or for some firms to face
externalities, or for some firms to have'limiting resources, or "for some
firms to face differeht-,input prices (or different output prices for
homogeneous products) , or for some consumers to be affected by other
13
consumers. If an economy does contain any firms or consumers that have
these characteristics and are behaving efficiently according to their
own criteria, we know from the theory of second best that having others
satisfy the classical PE does not assure an efficient outcome. It
provides at most a third best situation.
Lobbying Expenditures
One thing missing from most treatments of PE is explicit inclusion
of governmental behavior and of citizens' efforts to affect it. I turn
now to a look at some simple models of lobbying expenditures and
political contributions.
Model MI-10
The individual is assumed to maximize the utility function U(X,C)
subject to X > 0, C > 0 and (1-t) < p^ X + p C where X is all goods, C
X c
is political contribution, and t is income tax rate. I asstjrae p =
(l-t)/2. Why would a person's utility be affected by contributing to
the political process? Perhaps because of a belief that every citizen
has a responsibility to participate in the political process and a
feeling of satisfaction that comes from meeting that responsibility.
Merit wants and merit goods will be discussed later in this paper. A
person might want to make political contributions to influence
governments' choices of merit goods.
First, suppose X > 0 and C® 0. Then U = Xp and (U - ^P_) ^ 0*
X c c
Assume the strict inequality holds. Then the marginal utility obtained
from contributing $1 to political action is less than the marginal
14
utility obtained from, the-alternative use of, the dollari As I rises.,.
however, X falls until- Ui. Xp - - 0-,and C > 0.-. i
c c ' " •
Assume'C >• 0-.:o By. totally^ differentiating the, (equality) income
constraint and the (equality) FOC with respect to income we can find the
effect of I upon C. Assume U 0, iie;, themarginal utility of goods
xc
consumption is independent..of. the level, of C., Then we, can derive
3C/3I = iiU^'^(t-l)^/2
where
> 0
y= (p (l-t)/2)/" I
X . - V0
Px
,^(l-t)/2'>
U** >= 1/U <0. Also « 1/U " < 0. We find that 3C/3I > 0.
XX cc
Personal political contributions increase "as I increases;
By totally differentiating the ,income^constraint and the FOC with
respect to t, we can obtain-the effect of variation ,in^the tax'rate
on C, The result is . . ". • • • - -
3C/3t = yU*^^(l-C/2)ri-t)/2
- (U^^ •+ Mp^ )- X/2 ••• ^
The first line on the" right-hand side of this expression-is positive if
I > C/2. The term in parentheses]on the second i'ine is also negative
because it is a main diagonal'erement of a negative semidefihite matrix;
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the second row is therefore positive. Hence 9C/8t > 0. Increasing t
reduces the consumer's disposable income. But it also reduces the
implicit price of political contributions. The net effect is to
increase political contributions.
(As an aside I want to note that defining p^ as a decreasing
function of t destroys homogeneity of demand functions, raises a
question about the definition of compensated demand, and generates
nonsymmetric substitution terms.)
For persons in a position to do so, it may be more effective to
make one's political contributions at second hand so to speak by having
the firm that one manages or owns make political contributions. I now
look at some simple models of political contributions by firms.
Model MI-11
The Christian Science Monitor [Knickerbocker, 1985] reported
"MX [Missile] and SDX [Strategic Defense
Initiative or "star wars"] contractors were also
paying close attention to last November's
election. The Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities issued an analysis of Federal Election
Commission data Wednesday showing that political-
action committees sponsored by such contractors
gave more than $900,000 to congressional
candidates.
Nearly 60 percent of the money went to the eight
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and
. Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee up for
reelection. The top recipient ($73,549) was Sen.
John Warner (R) of Virginia, a strong MX sup
porter, who heads the Armed Services subcommittee
on strategic and theater nuclear forces. Ironi
cally, the next two top recipients. Republicans
Charles H. Percy of Illinois and Roger W. Jepsen
of Iowa, lost their reelection bids."
This suggests the following simple model.
16
IT = R(q) - C(q) - L; 3q/3L >0
where R(q) and C(q) are total, revenue and total costs and L is lobbying
and political campaign expenditures intended to increase government
purchases of the firm's product,
3tt/3l = OR/3q - 3C/3q)Oq/3L) -1 = 0
' ' I
or
MR - MC = l/(3q/3L) >0 . j.
The firm operates at a level of output at which MR > MC and does, not
operate at a PE point. Theory of second best tells us that a society
containing such firms is not efficient if it requires PE elsewhere.
Model MI-12
Consider now a single product firm that is subject to a tax on
profits and that can affect the tax rate by political expenditures.
TT = '(R(q) -*C(q)- - L}(l-t) ; t= 't(L); 3t/3LX.O--
Allowing L to be zero or positive,
3tt/3L = -(R-C-L)(3t/3L) - (1-t) < 0
L(3ti/3L) = 0
I first establish that 3t/3L = 0 implies L = 0, If 3t/3L = 0,
aTT/3L = -Cl-t) < 0
So L = 0. But I observe that businessmen do spend money to affect tax
rates, so I conclude that L > 0. And L > 0 then implies 37r/3L - 0. The
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fact that we observe businessmen using resources to affect tax rates
implies that their efforts do affect tax rates. If 3Tr/3L = 0, L can be
positive.
Now assume L > 0 and 3t/3L < 0, Define ri = ( 3t/3L) (L/1) , the
elasticity of tax rate w.r.t. L. Then
R-C-L = L > 0
R-C-L>0. Also
n ^ t •'
If the excess of revenue over variable costs increases, the firm
increases its political expenditures. This is shown also in model MI-
13.
Model MI-13
This is a variation of MI-12. It is assumed that p = p(q,a), where
a is a parameter in the demand function and 3p/3a > 0, and R = pq.
Following the argument of MI-12, L is assumed positive. The FOC
are
3TT/3q = (1-t) (MR-MC) = 0
3tt/3L = - (R-C-L) 3t/3L -(1-t) »= 0
The SOC terms are
3^TT/3q^ = (1-t) 3^(MR-MC)/3q^ < 0
18
9^ir/3q3L « - (MR-MC) Ot/8L) = 0'
a^Tr/3L^ = 2 3t/3L - TT3^t/3L^ < 0
Differentiating the FOC w.r.t. a and solving yields,
3a ~r 3L •• 3^2/
» ^ r I
This is positive because the terra in parentheses is negative', 3t/3L < 0,
and the last two terms are positive. Exogenous increases in demand lead
to increased expenditures aimed at reducing the profits-tax rate.
Model MI-14
This section looks at a firm that can reduce its costs by
increasing its lobbying expenditures and/or political campaign
contributions. By increasing its political expenditures i^t can, e.g.,
get cheaper irrigation water, cheaper barge travel on the Mississippi,
or lower labor costs. This section also looks at the effect of changing
the way profits are measured for tax purposes.
The first version of the model is
R a pq; p constant
•C = C(q.L) , 3C/9L < 0
TT = (l-t)(R-C-L) , , •
The relevant FOC is • , .
3tt/3L = - (l-t)(,3C/,3L + 1) = 0,
The latter implies 3c/3L = -1. The SOC are
' 3^TT/3q^ = -d-t) 3MC/3q < 0 •'
19
3^7r/3q3L = -(1-t) Omc/DL)
3^tt/3L^ = -(l-t)O^C/3L^) < 0
The latter implies 3^C/3L^ > 0.
The second version is
Ti = (1-t) (R-C) - L
otherwise the same as the first. The firm in this ;model cannot subtract
lobbying expenses before computing profit tax liability. Now
I
a7T/3L = -(l-t)OC/3L) -1
The latter implies 3C/3L = -l/(l-t). Now
-1 > -l/(l-t).
3C/3L is larger (closer to zero) under the first law than under the
second. Because 3C/9l < 0 and flattens out as L increases, this implies
that L is larger under the first law than under the second. The firm's
political expenditures are larger if they are deductible for tax
purposes than if they are not deductible.
This argument and the later discussion of Figure 3 show that we
should not confuse Pareto-efficiency with ethically desirable. PE
points are determined by existing values as reflected in demand
functions for marketed goods and by existing distribution of factor-
ownership. The latter is determined by market forces, by tax laws, and
by laws of property rights. If you have ethical objections to existing
20
market-expressed values, to existing'distribution of factor ownership,
to existing tax laws, then you can -logically conclude that, Pareto
efficiency deviates from ethically desirable,
Pareto efficiency takes existing distributions of income, factor
ownership,- and- property rights as'given. Because of'the existence of a
high-indome-elastici'ty and a'high wealth-elasticity ,of demand .for
political representatidhi the rich-can afford,^ and have^strong
incentive-, to make substantial political expenditures •^..They finance j
efforts to influence the "laws'that determine distribution of income,,
factor-ownership, and property rights' in ways favorable-to themselves.
By doing "so,'they obtain favorable'tax laws; favorable tax treatment for
depreciation, depletion, and exploration expenses; less restrictive
regulations by EPA and OSHA; etc. How can we know that- PE is efficient
unless' we know that the^laws that result, from these.efforts contribute .
to achieving efficiency?' "Onde organizations have become large, they-
necessarily acquire the power-to interfere with-the•political process •
that is supposed to bust them" [Maris, 1972, 'p. 113j . And what about
the tax-shel'ter industry that -is' created by legislative acts? Kaiser
[1984, p. IC] wrote ' •
If any further- evidence were needed to prove, that
-the rich are different, the tax—shelter industry
that's the right word, industry--provides it.
"' Here' s* a phenomenon . which keeps thousands of
accountants and lawyers busy distorting the
national•economy in a variety'of ways.
When we base public policy decisions on existing income distri—-
bution we grant "to the'winners'in the economic arena the right to set
the rules in the political''arena that determine the next outcome in the
21
economic arena. After all, one modern version of the Golden Rule is
"Those who have the gold make the rules."
Interpersonal Comparisons
The strong appeal of PE rests on the premise that its use allows us
to make statements about welfare without making inter-personal compar
isons. This premise is doubly false. I will demonstrate two kinds of
interpersonal comparisons of utility that are made in PE analysis. When
we take the position-that PE points are superior to non-PE points we are
making an interpersonal comparison in the form of an assertion that
people who value only ends should get what they want but people who
value means and ends should not get what they want. This is easily
demonstrated by Figure 2. According to PE criteria, the most desirable
outcomes are on the contract curve PP^. This is consistent with the
desires of people who value only ends. If they are at a point off PP^ ,
they can both become better off by a move to PP^. But if the firms
value means and ends they would rather not be on PP^. They would prefer
to be on the "utility contract curve" that passes through points of
tangency of their iso-utility curves. If we assert that points on PP^
are superior to points off pp\ including points that are on the utility
contract curve, we are asserting that it is undesirable for firms that
value means to get what they want; they should get what we decide is
good for them. This assertion can be easily generalized. Whenever we
assume all people are of Type X and apply PE type criteria we are making
the value judgment: It is desirable that Type X people get what they
want but that non-Type X people not get what they want.
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•Comparison of results of Models MI-1, -3, and -5- .with Models ;MI-2,;
-4, and -6, respectively can also be used to substantiate this generali
zation.
The previous discussion on externalities in PE shows that our
standard PE criteria contain a second interpersonal comparison, one that
discriminates against individuals whose utility is influenced .by exter
nalities,. The marginal utilities of all arguments of a person's utility
function are relevant if th"e person is indifferent to externalities..
But only some arguments of a person's -utility function.are relevant if
the person's welfare is affected by externalities.
, Almost invariably we derive-PE conditions under the assumption that
people are indifferent toward the use made of their resources: that,
their utility depends upon levels of consumption and is independent of
the way their resources are-employed to finance their consumption.
People do have preferences concerning,the kind of.work that they do.
And some investors prefer some kinds of'investments over others: e.g.,
local businesses over multinational corporations. • In,deriving PE condi
tions under the assumption that people are indifferent to the use made
of their resources we assert that it is desirable-.that people who are
indifferent should get what they want but people who do prefer some uses
of their resources over others should not get what they want.
The PE conditions are necessary conditions .for the maximization of
a Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Function.(See Mueller [1979, pp..
174, 183] and Streeten in Myrdal [1958, p. xxv],) If we^use such a
function our argument makes the shocking assertions: in order to maxi
mize welfare it is necessary to discriminate against, people.'who value
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means and Co discriminate against people whose utility functions contain
externalities as arguments.
The dependence of PE outcomes upon distribution of income or
resource ownership can be shown by use of a box diagram. Suppose that
unbeknownst to Robinson Crusoe, another castaway—Mr. Bligh—lives on
the other side of theCrusoe's island. On Bligh's side, growing condi
tions are less favorable than on Crusoe's side. The men apply equal
knowledge, intelligence and diligence but Bligh harvests only BXj^ and
Byj^ of products X and Y whereas Crusoe harvests CXj^ and Cy^^. See
Figure 3. After harvest, the two meet and begin to barter. Neither
will accept an outcome that is less favorable than his initial position
at point P, The outcome therefore is in the area between the two indif
ference curves that pass through point P. The line segment EE' is a
portion of the contract curve. Movement from P to a point on EE' is a
Pareto-improvement. Trading is mutually beneficial, but C started out
with more of both X and Y and still has more of both after trading.
Point R represents an initial position if the two sides of the
island are equally productive. The outcome of voluntary bargaining is
now between the two indifference curves that pass through R, GG' is a
portion of the contract curve. Amove from R to-GG' represents a
Pareto-improvement.
Our PE criteria—if we believe them—permits us to assert with
certainty that movement from P to EE' or from R to GG' is an improve
ment. But they do not permit us to say anything about movement from P
to GG'.
Suppose that points between the two indifference curves that pass
23b
Figure 3.
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through P do not allow Bligh to consume enough to stay alive until the
next harvest season, whereas they allow Crusoe to indulge his natural
gluttony. Assume also that (a) the island's topography makes it easy
for Crusoe to keep Bligh off from Crusoe's fruitful side of the island
and (b) Crusoe's rate of substitution between gluttony and harvest labor
is such that he is unwilling to pay Bligh for helping with harvest. In
sura, Crusoe is quite willing for Bligh to starve to death in order to
satisfy his own appetites.
Remaining at P or at EE' condemns Bligh to death. But even if
movement to GG' would allow both Crusoe and Bligh to live well, none of
our present criteria provide a basis for concluding that GG' is prefer
able to P or to EE'.
Economists generally accept the "as if" method a valid for expla
nation of human behavior. It is also useful for explaining economists'
behavior. By applying it to the preceding paragraph, we see that econo
mists value economic inequality so highly that they are willing to allow
poor persons to starve to death in order to maintain inequality. (At
least, they behave as if they were.)
If we want to claim that economics deals with human welfare,
honesty ought to compel us to admit that it deals with it in a terribly
inadequate way so long as its criteria do not permit us to identify the
better of (a) an adequate living for all and (b) starvation for some and
gluttony for others.
What I want to have explained to me is this. In our PE analyses,
we regularly make the value judgment that people whose preference system
differs from the one we assume should not get what they want. And we
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regularly make another interpersonal comparison: between persons'
marginal social significance — see discussion of Model MA-8 later. Why
then can we not develop a criterion that permits us to choose between
EE' and GG'? ... ,
My Bligh-Crusoe analysis of PE applies to any inequality in
resource ownership, including inequality in inherited privilege —
whether the privilege is due to race, IQ, family (being 'one of the right
people), or wealth. Thus PE concludes: differences, even gross ones,,'
in inherited resource endowments lead to efficient outcomes.
PE criteria do not establish that any PE point is superior to any
non-PE point, nor that it is superior to any other PE point. To estab
lish PE of a public policy is not sufficient to establish its desir
ability, even on PE grounds. An economy is always in some initial posi
tion. To establish the desirability of adopting a PE policy, it is
necessary to establish that the PE point that will result from adoption
> • . r. • • - ' > I I , •
of the policy is superior to the initial position. We never have enough
information to make such a comparison.
There is even an easier way to show that PE depends upon distri
bution of resource ownership or income. Of the expression "make some
people better off without making anyone else worse off," we ask,
"better, or worse, off compared with what?" I don't believe that we
t I ^ ,
mean "You will be at least as well off under possible policy A as under
hypothetical policy B." In using the phrase "better, or worse, off" the
basis for comparison is the status qiio: "better, or worse, off than you
are now." If no one is to be made worse off than he is at present than
the status quo imposes a restriction.
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This section has demonstrated the sensitivity of PE to specifi
cation error in two-dimensional situations. The next section demon
strates the sensitivity in many-dimensional situations.
MULTIDIMENSIONAL SITUATIONS
To argue that satisfying the classical PE conditions generates
inefficiency, I will use Pazner's [1973] model and slight variations
thereof,
Classical PE
Model MA-1
Define
= quantity of commodity j consumed by person h;
j=l,2,,..,J; h=l,2,..,,H. (If Xj^ is an output, its
flow is measured by a positive number. If it is an
input, its flow is measured by a negative number and
amount "consumed" is amount "used in production.")
= (x,^, x^^) == vector of quantities consumed by
n Ih 2h Jh
h-th customer,
H
X. - Z , X. = total consumption of commodity j.
J h=l jh
Uh(X^) " ~ b-th person's utility function.
F(x^, X2, ...J Xj) = F(X) = community's implicit
transformation function.
U^(Xi), social welfare
function (SWF).
W
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Wis assumed to be'strictly increasing in each U^. '•Because of the sign
convention on inputs and output's this means that Wis an increasing
function in each The Lagrangean is
L = W(U) - XF(X)
' j . I
An omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent Welfare Czar is assumed
» . ' * t ^ - I ,11. , ' I ' r .
to manipulate the to maximize W(U) subject to F(X) = 0, The first-
order conditions can be expressed as
OW/3U. )Ou,/3x., ) - A8F/ax. = 0
h . h jh . , .j
for all j and h. ,
If we replace j by i' and divide the two equations we obtain from simple
manipulation ' - >
OU,/3x.^)/(3U,/3x.J = (3F/3x.)/(3F/3x.). '
h ih" h j n • ^ 1 J
Because the right-hand side is'independent of• h (of person), we can also
write ^ . .
(3U /3x. )/(3U /3x. ) = (3F/3x.)/(3F/3x.,)
8 ig g Jg 3. -J
These last two equations state the PE condition that -the marginal rate
of substitution between productis i and j be the same' for all persons and
that this MRS equals the community's MRT, " - . • / -
This formulation, we should note, implicitly contains the classical
assumption that 'productive activities are disval'ued'. -• If' item-j is an
input, X., is' a negative number. Because-W is strictly increasing in
J" ' •> I . . • ,
^ ^ means that reducing the supply of input j, e.g., labor
and skill, increases person h's utility. Thus the formulation precludes
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the possibility that some persons may enjoy utilizing their productive
inputs or applying their skills in some activities.
Merit Wants
Model MA-2
Pazner's discussion of merit wants is admirably suited to showing
effect of objective on PE solutions. What are merit wants? The termi
nology is due to Musgrave, who wrote [1976, p. 66]
Interpreted as a device to provide consumer infor
mation, as a means of allowing for externalities, or
as an expression of voluntary giving in kind, the
merit-good concept falls within the framework of
traditional analysis in which efficient allocation
must in the end be related to individual choice.
But, when interpreted as imposition of preferences
of the ruling group or decision makers, allocation
on a merit-good basis stands outside what has been
dealt with here as the theory of social goods. In
all these cases it is evident, however, that inter
ference may apply with regard to private goods
(e.g., pornography) no less than to what we have
defined as social goods. The social- and merit-good
problems must therefore be distinguished,
Pazner [1973, p. 461] writes
The presence of merit wants means that in the social
calculus individual preferences are either neglected
altogether or supplemented by other considerations.
In other words the implementation of such wants
involves to some extent imposing on individuals
choices that they would not otherwise make.
In an individualistic setting the only possible
rationale for including merit wants in a normative
model must be based on the premise of imperfect
information, whatever the causes, of members of the
society as to the consequences of certain actions.
The welfare implication of such imperfect infor
mation is that the individual cannot be left sole
judge of what is "good" or "bad" for him. We avoid
the delicate question of who is likely to know this
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better than him by postulating a perfectly informed
elite on the shoulders of which rests the responsi- v
bility of social policy.
First, merit wants could arise because the individual
has imperfect informationrof the. consequences of,his_
own actions on his welfare. And second, they could
arise because he has imperfect information of the
consequences of actions taken byi.other. individuals on
his own welfare (or> if he "cares" about other
members of the society, actions taken by him on.the
welfare of others.) Only this second category -
involves merit wants in-the form of unaccounted-for-
externalities. Nevertheless,, merit wants and exter
nalities turn out to be.yery closely, related.in their
policy implicationsi... - - ,
In one formulation, 'the SWF.is'affected.by aggregate amounts; in
another formulation, by, their distribution. In the-first situation, the
SWF is
w[u^(Xj^), VV' ^1' ^^2*
Partially differentiating the Lagrangean with respect, y.ields
(because dk. = dx., )
J
Stt
3W h' 3F • • •• - • - • ^
9U, 9x.i 3x. ' -9x,.'
^ Jh J . j
And differentiating-with respect to and manipulating yields
8W ^ 9F" 9W
3U. 3x., 3x. -- 3x.
h jh ^ J J
3W 3F SW ^
3U, 3x., 3x. - 3x.
h ih 1 - 1
If we assume 3W/3x^ = 0, then . , •
3U^/3x.^ 3F/3x. 3W/3x.Jh _ J 3
3a/3x.^ 3F/3x. X3F/3x;
h ih 1 1
or
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MRS^. = MRT. . + T. .
I quote what Pazner [p. 468] wrote because it is also relevant to
later material in this paper. He wrote
the marginal rate of substitution of any consumer
for any pair of commodities has to be equated to an
entity which is independent of the particular con
sumer under consideration, and hence is common to
all consumers. This immediately suggests treating
•the expression on the right hand side as a price
ratio that would be the same for all consumers.
Furthermore, the representation of this price-like
expression as a discrepancy from the marginal rate
of transformation indicates that unfettered reliance
on the competitive price mechanism cannot lead to an
optimal outcome. It suggests, rather, that con
sumers and producers should be made somehow to face
different prices....
(My underlining for emphasis.) In the presence of merit goods the SWF
cannot be maximized—a PE outcome cannot be achieved—without public
action to cause inequality between MRT.. and MRS... He also wrote
i-J 3-J
[p. 468]
the optimum can be reached by using (n-1) producer
prices, (n-1) consumer prices and the proper distri
bution of income implied by the optimum. That is,
setting MRT^j (j=li n; j^i) as the producer
price of commodity j MRS^* as the consumer price,
and securing for the optimal distribution of income
by means of lump-sums will enable the planner to
implement the optimum....
He interprets the discrepancy as an excise tax (or subsidy). If item j
is a demerit good 9W/8x. < 0 and T.. is a tax on item i. If item i is
^ J ij j j
a merit good 9W/3xj > 0 and T^j is a subsidy on item j.
1 <•
Model MA^3
In this model, the SWF of the "pe^^fectly informed elite" is
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affected by the distribution of items, ''The SWF is"
WUj^(Xj) f ^2(^2) t •••I * '^ll' **' * * ^^12'
Manipulating FOC and assuming 9W/3x^ = 0 yields
MRS^. « MRT. . + T. ..
IJ J-Jh
* ( j
where, now
3W/9x.. . : .
•j;.
ijh X3f/
Note that in MA-2. T.. is constant acro's~s all individuals, whereas in
MA-3, the tax varies among Individuals.
. '..1 . - • '
Pazner also shows how his formulations can be interpreted in order
to deal with environmental pollution and deterioration.
Merit wants and universal hedonism are similar in that each
reflects individuals' concern for others. But they incorporate this
*• i j ' *
concern in different ways.
Universal Hedonism
Model MA-4 ,
Pazner follows the classical formulation for each individual's
utility function; the assumption of egoistic hedonism.. That is, each
person'is exclusively concerned with his own consumption levels.- An
obvious alternative is to'assume universal hedonism, in which-each
person's utility is-affected by everyone el-se's levels of consumption.
There are gradations between these two, of course. I will first look at
universal hedonism. There are two possibilities, that parallel Pazner's
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two formulations of merit wants. In one, each person is concerned about
level and distribution of goods and services, A person's utility
function then becomes U, (x,, ,x_, ,... ,x,. ,x, « ,... ,x-_ ,.,. ,x-„) , i.e.,
n 11 Zi J1 IZ JZ J ri
,. .. ,X^ , . . . ,Xjj) . And Che SWF is, of course,
w[u^(Xj^,X2,....Xjj), n|^ (X^.X2,...,X^)
From the FOC,
A3F/3K. -
^/3x.^ - X3F/3X. -
3U
W
Something new appears in this expression. We can call 9W/3U^ "the
marginal social utility", or "marginal social value", or "marginal
social significance" of person t. It equals the change in value of the
SWF per unit change in the t-th person's utility. Each person's
equilibrium MRS^^ is a function of the marginal social values of all
other persons, and also of all other person's marginal utilities.
Suppose that ~ ^ t h. Then
• MRS. = MRT. . + T.
ijh ij ijh
LOw/auJOu /9x, ) .
t^h t t .-jh > „where T. < T. .g.
Persons g and h may be somewhere between egoistic hedonists and
universal hedonists. They may be familial hedonists, or racist
hedonists, or nationalistic hedonists, e.g. Then the difference between
T. and T. can be much greater than if both are universal hedonists.
T-Jg igh
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Let persons' g and h be concerned only with consumption levels of people
in mutually, exclusive groups C l and-C respectively. Then the range of
summations' in T. and T. . become teC^;, X ^ h and tcC tifg. •; Implicit'
ijh ijg I n' g •
in my use of -the concept of universal- hedonism..is -the idea that
> 0 for all t..K If 9U /3x.^ >.0 for. some t, T. is negative and ,PE .
t' jh ijh
calls for subsidizing .person-h's consumption of item j.
The facts that we have widespread, .even'if not'universal; public
support for a variety of public welfare^programs and that individuals do
make personal contributions to charity mean to me that some people are .
universal hedonists, or at least that their concerns are broader than
egoistic hedonism. Consequently I infer that MRT = MRS everywhere is
not a PE situation.
Limiting' Resources
Model MA-5
If so''ciety has any fully employed unspeci'alized resources, itS'SWF
is not maximized by equating''society's- MRT to 'every consumer's MRS. To
show this, we' add to the problem, a"constraint, "GCxX < where is •
the amount of a scarce resource available to society, and a nonnegative
Lagrange multiplier y,-which "is the\shadow-price of the scarce resource.
If this resource is fully employed; - ' ' >•
OU /3x. )/Ou /3x. ) = (X3F/9x. + y3G/ax.)/
g ig S Jg 1 ,
(X3F/3Xj + u3G/3xJ
The value of y equals the reduction in the value of the SWF that results
from reducing G^ by one unit. When it is positive, PE does not equate
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MRS to MRT. Evaluating Che right-hand side, of this expression requires
knowing much more than society's transformation function. It also
requires knowing values of 3G/3x^, 9G/3x^, and the Lagrange multipliers.
We conclude that the classical PE condition are cyclical conditions.
They are appropriate when society has no limiting resource, but not when
society has any fully employed limiting resourcei Similarly, the
contract curve in Figure 2 is not a set of points of maximum efficiency
if either firm's use of x or y is restricted by its ownership of a third
resource.
Externalities in Production
Model MA-6
Models MA-2 and MA-3 can be interpreted as incorporating effects of
externalities, see Pazner [1973, pp. 469-71]. But the result is an
incomplete treatment of externalities because pollution, environmental
degradation, and desirable externalities do not enter any individual's
utility function in his models. Model MA-4 shows effect of
externalities in consumption. MA-6 also explores externalities.
Define
y^ = quantity of externality or by-product turned out by
activity that produces x^
y. = f.Cx.)
Write each person's utility function as U^(X^ ,yj^ ,y2,... ,yj) . Then a
typical FOG is
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®yj
And 3Uj^ 3Uj^ 3y 3y 3U^
> >
•
3x.
.1 1
a'
p
CO
3yi
3yi 3x". '
1
Here as iti'MA-4, the FOC for PE -for each consumer are affected by the
marginal social significance of every other consumer.
To simplify, suppose that- production of item i turns out no.
externality.' Then - - - ''i. i - ' • .j •
MRS^. = MRT. . + T.
. .. ij i-J , , V - .
where ^ . u
3y.
T... =- -j-J- Z ,/(X3F/3x.)
iih ox. oU^.'oy.-/ ' L , fj t t '
If 3U^/3xj < 0, ^ ^ maximizing the SWF requires public action,,
such as levying a tax on item • '
As the individual consumer"sees his utility-maximization problem, a
typical FOC is - v., '> • ' . r ,! ,
8U' Sa 3y. • '
V IZT
Jh J • - - -•
The individual consumer is. such a smaH part of the total market that he
treats.Sy^/3Xj-as .zero. Los Angeles motorist, e.g., knows that
increasing or decreasing his own.use of-an automobile, will.hav.e no . ,
f -
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perceptible effect on the smog. Consequently the h-th utility
maximizing consumer operates where
8Uj^/3Ki^ p.
Only by chance will points that satisfy this equality satisfy the
FOC for PK. In a society that contains merit goods or externalities in
production or consumption, the only interesting feature of the invisible
hand is its invisibility. If the invisible hand maximizes the SWF,
individual's utility functions are not maximized. If it allows
individuals to maximize their own utility functions, the SWF is not
maximized. As Pazner [p. 471] observes, the feature common to cases of
merit goods and externalities is that "even though they, generally,
present distributional problems, they cannot merely be solved by pure
redistributional .devices (short of allocating optimal consumption
baskets directly to the individuals—i.e., rejecting the market
mechanism altogether) and need explicit supplementary pricing
policies."
This example demonstrates another characteristic of our hedonism
assumption; We not only assume egoistic hedonism, we also assume
market, or monetaristic, hedonism. We only allow people to value things
that can be bought and sold. The y^ in MA-6 are not marketed so we
conventionally exclude them from our investigations.
We can use MA-6 to reach the conclusion that Lang [1980] reached by
a different route. He took the position, correctly I believe, that
Pareto optimality is our only theoretical definition of economic
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efficiency. And he showed that demonstrating that a public policy
increases private,, pecuniary costs; .of production does not demonstrate
that the policy .introduces inefficiency. -
He analyzes limitations ph..the use of feed additives by livestock'
producers and .argues. I"p. •774.]-, "In a Pareto-eff iciency context, the-
livestock output-health .risk trade-off is'an .intimate .part of the
efficiency question. The economic efficiency of livestock.production
cannot-'be evaluated independent of' the' level of risk." .He shows, that a
Pareto-efficient allocation of resources can be'achieved both-in' the
presence and the absence of- restrictions on .use of feed additive's, but
that the two Pareto-efficient allocations are .not Pareto-coniparable; He
carries out a similar analysis of the effect of limiting, farms to 160
acres that use irrigation water from Bureau of Reclamation dams, and
again reaches the conclusion that a Pareto-efficient allocation can be
achieved in the presence and also in the absence of the acreage
limitation. Many public-policy issues are like these two issues: they
concern imposition or removal or relaxation or tightening of a
restriction. Pareto efficiency can be-achieved in" the presence and also
in the absence of the restriction. For example, Pareto efficiency can
exist under slavery and under a system that prohibits slavery. But
Pareto criteria are inadequate to determine which Pareto-efficient point
is superior. The choice between the two PE points goes beyond the
question of economic efficiency into the area of the public's values.
Lang's formulation shows that the choice involves consideration of
property rights and observes that [p. 775], "nothing in the training of
economists can be used to determine which definition of property rights
38
is best,"
Assume that item one is an input,• that is the only externality
that enters anyone's utility function, and that 9y^/3x^ > 0 but
3yj^/3Xj = 0 for j ^ 1. Let w[u^(X^, yj^) ] denote the maximum value of
the SWF. Note that attaining this maximum requires that society impose
a tax on the use of input one. The value of the SWF is not maximized
unless producers' private pecuniary costs of production are increased by
imposition of a tax on input one. Let w[u^(X^, ^
the maximum value of the SWF if the use of input one is prohibited. And
let W[U^(X°, y°)] be the maximum value of the SWF if input one is
neither prohibited nor taxed. We know from the properties of a,maximum
that
The effects of y^^ may be so undesirable that the excise tax on y^^ that
maximizes the SWF drive x^ and y^^ to zero. Then the equality holds. If
any ^ 0 we have
w[Uh(<, y*)] >w[u^(x^. yp]
The most likely situation is that
w[u^(X^, y*)] >W[U^(XP, 0)] >w[lI^(X°, y^'
Then the worst public policy of all, i.e., the one that produces the
smallest maximum of the SWF, is the policy that neither prohibits nor
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taxes the use of input one. If society fails to .restrict; the use of }
input one, it is behaving inefficiently,- i.e., behaving- in a way that is
inconsistent with its.own objectives.- v, • • . • i '
'The investigators .who .show that some public policy that restricts
use of feed additives^or .pesticides- will result in increased private, ,
pecuniary production costs and will therefore reduce .efficiency.or
introduce inefficiency are able to. reach this conclusion«only by
assuming that the externality-y^ enters no one's utility function and is
not a demerit good. •-
From the fact"that we do have.environmental protection -laws and
have pressures for even-more restrictive ilegislation than-has been
enacted, I infer two things:' (a) that we do have people who are
concerned with environmental'qualitypeople whose .welfare is increased
by taxation of or prohibition of polluting inputS'Or outputs, and (b)
that we can only achieve a PE situation by imposing restrictions on use
of some inputs or production of some outputs.
Full Employment As A Merit Good
^Model. MA-7,, , , • - . , .
The Employment Act of 1946 calls on the government to "promote
maximum employment, production, arid purchasing power." Some of the
in the SWF in- MA-2 might be interpreted as levels of employment", with
3W/9xj > 0 of course. Then T^^ would be a subsidy'paid on employment of
resource j. Thus a subsidy to'promote full employment, though it
violates the classical PE conditions, may be an efficient device "for
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maximizing the value of the SWF.
It is traditional to distinguish macroeconomic goals such as full
employment or control of inflation from the microeconomic goal of "effi
ciency". This model shows that to be a false distinction, at least so
far as the macro-goal of "full" or "maximum employment" is concerned.
Society has demonstrated through its passage of the Emplojmient Act of
1946 that it is concerned with the aggregate level of employment. I do
not see how any public policy study that ignores this concern can claim
to have identified an efficient policy. Such a study is mistakenly
using the SWF of Model MA-1; i.e., it is using a wrong SWF, one that
ignores society's care about the level of employment. The study
contains specification bias, to borrow a term from statistics.
One final implication of these models: We cannot hope to decide
what is PE and what is not unless we know all the arguments of each
individual's utility function and of the SWF.
Existence, Or Sacred, Value
In an essay that drew from national surveys and from individual's
life histories, Yankelovich [1981] reported a great deal of constancy in
U.S. values but also some significant trends that we economists need to
recognize. He found that people are placing an increasing emphasis on
sacred and expressive values and less emphasis on instrumental values.
Economists are familiar with instrumental values. These values judge
things by their effectiveness as means to ends. Yankelovich uses
"sacred" in the sociological sense. A sacred outlook values things for
themselves, for their intrinsic characteristics. Expressive values are
also opposed to instrumental values. Whatever is expressive also has
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value, in .its own right.. . , . . , . . -
An employer who treats employees purely as tools for get^ng more
output or more profit, applies instrumental values. .In most studies of, .
public policy we economists adopt, this same view. Employees are means,
to an end of greater consumer surplus^, or lower cost, or .most profit.
We also assume that-employees-and .employers, have a purely instrumental ,
attitude toward their own work. They neither like nor dislike jobs,,
they-do not use expressive ..values ,to j.udge jobs, tfhey j-ust do, their jobs
to make money. A devout Christian employer who values employees as good
workers and also as fellow human beings .because employer and employee
are all brothers and sisters under-the parenthood of God is applying,
sacred values--both sociological and .religiousr-ras well as instrumental
ones, . An atheistic employer who values employees- as fellow humans, as
being important in themselves, is applying sacred values in the strictly
sociological sense.,. . _ - r • . .
Yankelovich discusses yarious manifestations of .the decreasing
emphasis on instrumental values and the increasing importance of ^sacred
and expressive values. Fewer people are satisfied to evaluate jobs from
a purely instrumental viewpoint, which views jobs solely as a,means to
money and family support. More people are expecting jobs to provide
challenge, satisfaction of personal .accomplishment, and opportunity for
personal growth. More women.are working for self-fulfillment as well as
for money,
The practice of using money^to judge others' social standing has
been declining, as has the emphasis on consumptipn as a method of demon
strating that one has "made'itGrpwth.'of nation^ entitlement pro-
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grams—aid to dependent children, medicare, e.g.,—the womens' movement,
the environmental movement, pressure for equal pay for work of equal
value: all express increasing emphasis on sacred or expressive values.
Changing value systems have led to increasing concern for satisfying
interpersonal relations, and for a stronger commitment to community
welfare and a stronger desire for the feeling of belonging to a
community.
Inglehart [1981] also reports finding a trend from Materialistic to
Post-Materialistic values.
I once heard a Yellowstone Park Ranger lecturing on park management
problems. After justifying their policy of hunting down and killing a
grizzly bear who had attacked a camper, he said "I hope we will always
have Grizzlies. I may never see one but I will feel better just knowing
that they are out there. The world will be a poorer place if we kill
all the Grizzlies." I agree with him; we place a sacred value on the
bears; their existence is important to us. Gilbert [1984], too is pro-
Grizzly and explains at length his reasons for placing a sacred value on
them.
Will [1983] expressed the sentiments of many people when he wrote
the following about whales.
"It probably is virtually impossible to kill humanely a
creature that large. But even if the problem of pain could
be solved, this problem would remain: There is something
' unseemly, something subversive of our own dignity, about
killing such splendid creatures.
Whether or not whales, with their complex brains, really
are, as some scientists say, "our neurological relations,"
is less important than this: Whales have individual person
alities, complex social behavior, and remarkable memories
and capacities for communication.
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As I sit with pen poised over, paper, I am, struck by the
oddness of cataloging reasons for abandoning the killing-
the cruel and utterly unnecessary killing of such
mysterious creatures, about which we have so much to learn.
It is possible, and not.exactly wrong, to give practical
reasons why saving the whales will be useful.^ But there are
times, and-.this is one, for rising above utilitarianism.
It is important to say. that ,life is enhanced. aesthetically
by the knowledge that these sociable creatures are swimming
—and- singing—oh the ,surface of the sea, and in the sutjless
depths below. Furthermore, mankind has dominion over the
Earth, but.mankind's unsteady, serpentine path toward finer
sentiments can be measured, in part, by evolving standards
of vrtiat constitutes civilized dominion over.lower animals.
Surely it involves a conviction, more intuitive.than reasqn-
ed, that Creation, and we as the responsible portion of it,
are diminished by wanton behavio.r toward creatures that^^so
stunningly exemplify the mysteriousness of the natural.'
Note the expression "a conviction, more intuitive than reasoned.
Most reasoned convictions are based on intuitively selected assumptions.
Wills here expressed a sacred perspective.
- Have you ever stood on the Snake River Plain and looked west across
Jackson Lake at the Teton R^e and feasted your eyes on that grand,
magnificient scene? Did it ever strike you as a bit odd' that that scene
had no economic value, but a commercial photographer's bitty 2" by 2"
slides of the scene had economic value? The Plain, Lake, and Mountain
Range do not enter into our national income or national wealth accounts.
But the slides do. What I have just said about the Tetons can be said
about almost any tourist attraction. The attraction is valueless, its
pictures are valuable. We .seem to'value shadow over substance.
Here we have one answer to Long's [1967] question on option value.
He wondered why a potential user of Sequoia National Park would" be
willing to pay for an option to visit it unless there was a chance of
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actually visiting it. The answer is that his question is too narrow.
It is limited to "potential users," I never intend or expect to see
(I am not a potential user of) live blue whales. But I am happy that
they exist. The answer is that grizzly bears and blue whales and ^
Sequoia National Park have existence value. Some of us find
satisfaction in knowing that they exist and we are willing to pay to
keep them in existence, just as we are willing to pay taxes to provide
aid to families with dependent children even though we never intend to
use or visit these families or their children. If blue whales, or
grizzlies, or walleye, or bluebirds, or Sequoia disappear, my world will
be impoverished; a flatter, grayer, more sterile place of less sweet
mystery. I feel diminished as a person and shamed as a human being
whenever the actions of the human race are responsible for the
extinction of any wild creature.
Long takes an instrumental view of the Park: the Park is not
valued for itself, for its parkness; it's only value is as a tool to
provide persons gratification when they sightsee, camp, hike, or photo
graph in the park. Many of us, however, apply sacred as well as instru
mental values to determine the worth of parks, whales, and bears. The
natural resource economists' concept of option value is an instrumental
perspective. It asks, "What is the probability of enjoying a trip to
Yosemite National Park w)rth?" Existence value, on the other hand, •
expresses a sacred perspective. It values Yosemite for its
Yosemiteness.
s-
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Model MA-8
In this model each person's utility function can be written as
XI. (X^ ) where y is something having sacred, or existence value, e.g.,
n h ,y
number of grizzly bears or blue whales. Society's transformation
function is now F(X,y) < 0, From the FOC for and y we obtain
MRS^ « MRT. + T. ^
ly ly lyh
T. E X|I- <0
PE calls for a subsidy on the "production" or protection or preservation
of wildlife or parks that have existence value. We would reach the same
conclusion if we excluded y from individual's utility functions but
included it as a merit good.
Concern for Equity
An individual's or a society's concern for equity (or fairness)
might be depicted in various ways. Just as we cannot judge the
efficiency of an agent's actions unless we know the agent's goals, we
cannot judge equity of an outcome until we define criteria for measuring
equity, (a) One way is to impose the restrictions x^^ > for some j
and all g, (b) We can limit the variance or third moment of the
frequency distribution of personal consumption, (c) We can treat
moments of the distribution as merit goods, (d) We can include moments
of the distribution in individual's utility functions.
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Model MA-9
I will choose the first. Assume for convenience that item J is the
only item relevant to equity considerations. The SWF is the s^e as in
Model MA-1. It is to be maximized subject to x. > x. for all g. Let
<38 3
lig be the Lagratige multiplier associated with this restriction. From
the FOC, we obtain
MRS^j =MRT. j . T.
^Uh =
" "Jh ° *J' ^ ^ ° >0. If > Xj. =0 and = 0. If
a person's consumption would otherwise fall below the poverty level x ,
the person's consumption of item J is subsidized. Persons whose
consumption exceeds are neither taxed nor subsidized.
Economists conventionally distinguish between "efficiency effects"
and "equity effects". This model leads me to conclude that this is a
false distinction. Individuals and society do care about fairness. No
policy that ignores that concern can be an efficient policy.
Interpersonal Comparisons
Model MA-10
«
This section does not present a new model> but looks at previous ^
models from a different perspective. From MA-1 we can derive the '
relation
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9W ^
3x.^: 3Ug 3x.g . , - .
• • J , I • * ' *
This implies [Pazner, 1973,- p., 466] "that the social marginal utility of
income of all ... consumers is-equalized at; the optimum'." He considers
, _ . r • _ - . - -j|
this to be "the individualistic optimality condition, par excellence of
the usual Paretian SWF model.V But-,- I see another, thing in the
classical PE model. It imposes a strong restriction on people's
utilities and thereby contains interpersonal comparisons.
We have already seen that classical PE refuses to admit certain
arguments-into anyone's utility, function: .(a) other person's levels of
consumption, (b) production externalities, (c) preferences for means,
(d) sacred values, (e). concern for equity. We in effect replace aW/9U^
by 3W/8U^ -where dU,.- is the change in person h's utility from consump-
hr hr
tion of item r, and set 3W/3U^^c= O-for all. h and. some r. In the
presence of externalities in,production, e.g.,:TO take all of person g's
preferences' into account-if .9U /9y. r. 0* •. -vre ignore part of person
g's preferences if 3U /3y-. X. 0. That way we can set the.T-.j^'s equal to
8 J J
zero. To obtain the classical PE,conditions we arbitrarily replace
"unacceptable" nonzero marginal utilities by zeroes. In.doing so we
make interpersonal comparisons under the ex-istence. of items (a) through
(e). • , .... . .
By our decision to exclude, some elements from utility functipns^we
are answering an ethical question that we have never consciously asked
and one that, we have no special competence to answer . The- question is
forcefully raised by. Mac -Rae [1976]. •After raising questions -about the
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rationale for democracy, he writes [p. 51]
"These questions take us into a realm between welfare
economics, valuative political theory, and the ethics
of other social sciences. They lead us also to ask
which of an individual's existing preferences ought
to be combined in a social aggregation system and
which ought not. They lead, then, to a morally and
politically oriented critique of welfare economics and
its political extensions, making use of its technical
sophistication but transcending the disciplinary bias
of economists that preferences are to be taken as
given
(I have underlined the ethical.question we answer without ever asking.)
He also writes [p. 69]
"Tlie individualistic framework in which valuations are
tacitly placed is also revealed by a peculiar termi
nology used by economists. The formulation of criteria
under which "social welfare functions"—a type of
ethical system—are specified typically characterizes
them as imposed by despots, dictators, or individual
social scientists. This assimilation of valuative
discourse to the given, unsystematized, and undebatable
tastes of the consumer encourages the neglect of syste
matic discourse, within the political and educational
systems of a society, concerning the relative merits of
various valuative standards and judgments."
Someone has to decide which items ought to be included. For
example, suppose some persons are "antagonistic hedonists", their
utility functions are of the form (X^, ..., ..., but
/8x. < 0 for all t h: the more that others have, the less well-
h jt
off is person h. Are antagonistic preferences to be allowed into a SWF?
(For my universal hedonists, > 0 for all t h and the strict
inequality holds for some j and t.) The choice of items to include is
not an economic question. Economists are no more competent to answer it
than other citizens. And are probably less competent to answer it than
philosophers. The choice of items is a public policy issue.
*v
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It seems to me. that public, policy makers, need more information than
that some outcome is PE. They would want^ to know whether the SWF that
is maximized is a desirable or an undesirable function. The knowledge
of equality between MRS and MRT tells us nothing about the nature of the
SWF that is maximized.
As I understand it, one of the attractions of classical PE is the
perception that its use.allows us to compare desirability of (some)
situations in a "scientific manner" .which apparently means without the
need for value.judgments. , As we see, this is a false.perception. The
FOC are necessary conditions for PE.solutions, to the problem of maxi
mizing a SWF. And these necessary conditions impose restrictions .on
ratios of marginal social, value and->on marginal utility. It is
necessary to satisfy, certain interpersonal -comparisons in-order to have
a PE solution. These interpersonal-'comparisons-are value judgments.
The actual situation, then, is the polar opposite of the perceived
situation. PE considerations do not.'dispense with value-judgments.
They require them. We need to note, too, that the decisions to use a
SWF and PE are themselyes ,yalue judgments.- ' •ii - i
If it is -not, .legitimate for^ us to make interpersonal comparisons in
. * I ,
order to compare PE points, ^y -is it legitimate'for us. to make inter
personal comparisons in'* ordier to identify PE points? ' Quite aside from
the issue of legitiiaacy, we are" not competent, and'should-not be
•• ' • j'rl'i i**
trusted, to make interpersonal comparisons.'
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No One Worse Off Compared With What?
Model MA-11
I earlier argued that the relevant meaning of "better, or worse,
off" for public policy study is "better, or worse, off than under the
status quo." If we know that some people will be better off, and no one
worse off, under possible policy A than under hypothetical policy B,
then we may conclude that A is superior to B. But we will hesitate to
recommend replacement of present policy by policy A until we determine
that A is Pareto superior to the present policy. To incorporate into PE
the restriction that no one is to be made worse off than under the
status quo,.we may proceed in various ways, depending upon how we intre-
pret "better, or worse, off than under the status quo." One way would
be to append to Model MA-1 the constraints U^(X^) > where is the
h-th person's current level of utility. Then a typical (interior) FOC
would be
oW h _ , 9F _ h _ Q
9U. 9x., 3x. h3x.,
h jh j jh
And we would have the classical PE conditions (9U/3xj^)/(3U/9x^j^) =
(3F/9x.)/(9F/3x.): MRS.. = MRT.. everywhere. Knowing that a situation
J ^ ^ J J
satisfies this equality everywhere does not tell us if we have a solu
tion in which no one is worse off than at present. The only way to
determine this is to test that the situation satisfies the constraints
s u^. Because we do not check the constraints, our classical PE
treatment of maximizing a SWF is only appropriate for comparing hypothe
tical policies under the "no one to be worse off restriction." In com
paring possible outcomes with existing outcomes, if we do not impose or
• »
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test such restrictions we are implicitly admitting the possibility of
making some persons worse off than under the status quo.
There is still more to the story. Suppose a policy does not make
person h better off but does make person g better off. Then we know
from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions that > 0 and ™ ^
Then
3W/9U. SU /ax. 9U /9x.
3W/3U 3U^/ \
g J
Compare this with the result we obtain if and are both zero.
3W/au^ 3U /3x.
j—h. g, Jg
3W/3U 3U,/3x..
g h jh
3U /3x. and X3F/3x. are both positive. 3W/3U, is person h's marginal
g Jg J ^ h ^
social value. These expressions say to me that a PE policy implicitly
assigns increased marginal social value to the persons benefitted by the
policy. Alternatively they say the obvious thing: To assure that the
policy that will be chosen will benefit members of an identified group,
be sure to assign each member a large marginal social value.
Model MA-12
ff
Another way to incorporate status quo restrictions is to
incorporate initial stocks of wealth (human and nonhuman, production and
consumption items) and a time dimension. Because there is an upper
limit on the amount of time that people can spend in producing,
consuming, and exchanging, there is a limit on the proportion of initial
stocks that a wealthy person can dispose of, and also on the amounts
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that a poor person can acquire. We can therefore impose on each person
a restriction t^CX. - Z^) <0 where Z, is a vector of initial stocks,
h h h h
Person h cannot maximize U. (X, ) if he does not have sufficient time to
n n
supply flows of services, from his stocks, and time to acquire
sufficient consumption goods to reach an unrestricted maximum of U^.
Then the Lagrangean is
L »= w(u^(Xj^), UjCXj), .... U^(Xjj)) - XF(X)
h
And
3Uh 3x.^ 3x. % 3x.^
Then
'ij X3f/3x^ +
In this model, in contrast with MA-10, t MRT^^.
The results from MA-II and MA-12 suggest the following hypothesis.
A solution that satisfies classical PE conditions need not satisfy the
requirement that no one be made worse off than at present; and any
situation that can be shown to satisfy this requirement does not meet
f
classical PC conditions. ^
if
IS PERFECT CCWPETITION PE? 4
A standard position is presented by Intrilligator [1971, pp. 277-
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279]. "The first basic theorem of welfare economics states-that a com
petitive equilibrium is .a Pareto optimum;,«•" And "The- second basic-
theorem of welfare economics states that any Pareto optimim can.be
realized .'as a particular competitive equilibrium.. He cites four^
assumptions used to obtain..these theprems: (a) consumer preferences are
convex and nonsatiating, (b) production possibilityset .is convex, (c)
the absence of externalities, and (d) existence of public goods.
In models MI-5, -6, and -7, and in Models MA-2, -3, -4, -6, and ~1
we saw why the a8sumption,.of absence of externalities is important to
the proof of these theorems of welfare economics. " In the optimal solu
tions to these models. cpnsxjmers have .different MRS's, and/or fims
possess differ,ent MRT's, and/or consiraer MRS-=^ firm MRT. Under_ perfect ,
competition,, a single price exists for,a homogeneous.item. If all firms
and all consumers face the same price ratio, the FOC for these models,
are not satisfied. We also saw that if firms value means,as .well, as,
ends (in MI-2 and MI-4) , if merit wants .exist (in .^-2-, -3, and .-7), or
if the "no worse off" restriction is-defined one way.(in MA-IO), then
different consumers have different MRS and different firms have
•different MRT. We also saw that a competitive outcome is not -PE. if some
people apply sacred standards (in MA-8), and is not PE if individuals or
society care about equity (in MA-9).
In sum, we find .a variety.-pf situations of perfect knowledge in-
which perfectly competitive .outcomes ,are not PE because PE requires,
imposition of taxes Xor subsidies) tpmake MRS and MRT unequal.' (In-'
addition various writers, e.g., Newberry and Stiglitz [1981] have shown
that a competitive market need not be efficient in the absence of a
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complete set of futures and risk markets.)
I believe in the existence of public goods, externalities, merit
wants, economic agents who value means as well as ends, and sacred
perspectives, and concern for equity; and therefore I conclude that the
two theorems maybe elegant and/or aesthetically satisfying, but do not
apply to any real-world situation.
INTERTEMPORAL ISSUES
In principle I guess we can modify any of the previous MA Models to
incorporate intertemporal choices. We can allow different subscripts to
identify the same product during successive time intervals and modify
F(X) appropriately. If we reformulate the models of merit goods,
universal hedonism, externalities, etc. to represent intertemporal
issues, we seem to be driven to the conclusion that a competitive
capital market does not provide an interest rate that is appropriate for
discounting public investments. If we assume a competitive capital
market equates intertemporal MRS and MRT, it follows that the market
violates the PE conditions. The PE conditions require that
intertemporal MRS and MRT differ by the 's or T^^ '^s.
ORDINALITY VS. CARDINALITY
One debate has concerned cardinality vs. ordinality of SWF and
individual utility functions and the issue of interpersonal compar
ability. After summarizing major contributors to the debate, Mueller
[1979, pp. 180-181] concludes
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."Thus the ^proper interpretation, of W based, oni the • •;
original presentations of Bergson and Samuelson and
-this most recent ^debate, is I .believe, -(1) that r. •
ordinal utility functions are sufficient as argu
ments ,of W when deriving the, necessary-conditions-.
for a Pareto optimum, (2) that cardinal, inter-
personally comparable arguments are required to • ;
select a single, best point from among the infinity
of Pareto optima, and (3) that W is, in any case,
ordinally defined•- i- ' '
Mueller's second point is correct but inadequate. I have already
argued that our decision to treat everyone as an egoistic, monetaristic
hedonist results in interpersonal comparisons. We discriminate against
everyone who is not an egoistic monetaristic. Each infinity of Pareto
optimum contains interpersonal comparisons.
His third point is inadequate, if there exist merit goods—as
discussed in MA-2 and -3, if full employment is a merit good, if sacred
values or equity considerations create merit goods, or if externalities
are demerit goods. Under these circumstances ordinal utility functions
are adequate and the SWF can be ordinal in the must be
cardinal in the j' ^ s®® this, consider Model MA-2. Suppose the
ordinal index U^CX^^) is replaced by a monotonic transformation •
We can replace W[.] by a monotonic transform R[.] such that
[aw/8U^)(3Uj^/8x^^] = (8R/3Vj )(3y^/3xj^). In doing so we obtain
MRsV. .= MRt.'. + T. I'
3.J
3R/3x.
•.ij X3E/3x.
And ® T.. for a given distribution of goods and services if and only
if 3R/3x. = 3W/3x., In a society that contains merit goods, the SWF
J .-j.. r i..
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must be cardinal in its merit good arguments. For a given set of
individual and social preferences and a given transformation function,
replacing one SWF index that is ordinal in merit goods by another
ordinal index will result in a different set of FOC.
IMPLICATIONS OF THEORY OF SECOND BEST
In these models we have identified some conditions that make
classical PE outcomes inefficient. There also exist other conditions in
some sectors of an economy which make classical PE outcomes impossible
in these sectors and hence, by the theorem of second best, make PE out
comes inefficient in other sectors.
If some optimality conditions cannot be satisfied, e.g., MRT's
cannot be equated, then a first best solution is not possible. We can
obtain a second best solution by optimizing subject to the constraint
that MRT's are unequal. If some first best optimality conditions cannot
be satisfied, requiring the others to be satisfied may not be desirable
because it does not provide a second best solution. It provides at most
a third best solution.
For example, various writers [see, e.g., Baumol and Klevorick,
1970] have demonstrated that regulated monopolists that are subject to
binding fair-rate-of-return constraints do not use the cost-minimizing
combinations of labor and capital. They do not use the PE combination
of inputs. Satisfying the FOC for PE elsewhere in the economy does not
provide a second best outcome.
The existence of sales and excise taxes interferes with the attain
ment of classical PE conditions. Some excise taxes may, however, be
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justified" as taxation of- demerit goods. The existence of an underground
economy interferes with satisfaction of any PE conditions, classical or
otherwise.' ' .
Taxes
Another obstacle to the achievement of classical PE,.is taxes,. . In
states where foods'.are not -subject' to, sales tax but nonfood items are,
consumers equate-MRS to -the negative of (food pr-ice)/.(n9nfood price plus
sales tax), whereas firms .equate MRT to the negative of-(food price)/
(nonfood price). • The difference-between•the two ,ratios means .that MRS f
MRT-and classical PE conditions are not.-satisf ied. The. same,thing can
be said'about excise taxes and income taxes: ,,they cause deviations from,
classical PE conditionsi They also cause'deviations from^PE conditions
in other "models"; 'Now, what other-deviations^^ frbm-.PE conditions will
produce a second-best•situation in.the presence, of these, tax-induced
deviations fromPE? A few taxes, e.g., excise taxes on..cigarettes-and
liquor, may be justified as-taxesion demerit goods.- ...
Underground Economy
r '
The existence of the "underground" or "cash" or "subterranean"
economy creates similar difficulties. (The.following material on the
subterranean economy is from Bawly [1982])., 'His preferred definition of
the subterranean economy is-[pp'. 6-7],: "that part jof the,gross national
product that is not measured by official statistics." It includes .the
following: funds derived'from-criminal;action, funds derived from
breaking foreign currency control laws, funds derived, from illegal work.
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and funds derived from untaxed extraterritorial economic activities.
Employees in the subterranean economy avoid income tax and social
security liabilities. Employers avoid social security contributions on
their employees' and their own incomes, income taxes, unemployment fund
contributions, sales taxes, license fees, and paper work, Bawly writes
[p. 117] that a New Yorker who wants a legal taxi business must pay
$60,000 for a taxi license. "No wonder many, mostly Blacks and
Hispanics', have ignored the city-granted monopoly and entered a 'gypsy'
taxi industry, where they earn an honest, hard, albeit illegal, living.
And he also writes [pp. 119-120] "The complexity, range, and number of
tax reports required of a new, young sole proprietor of a business being
set up in the city of New York, for instance, can easily lead him or her
to despair. Assuming the owner lives in any one of the five boroughs,
he or she is liable for no less than twenty (I) different taxes or
statements, and if two or more staff are employed, he or she must file
at least thirty-seven separate tax reports annually." We do not know
the size of the subterranean economy. But Bawly [p. 115] presents one
estimate that the portion of the U.S. subterranean economy that filed no
income tax returns in 1972 involved about five million persons who
received about $30 billion in taxable income. He also reports [p, 113]
a 1980 estimate of five million Americans who were legally obligated to
pay income taxes who paid none and whose aggregate income may have been
over $300 billion. For additional material on the underground economy,
see Carson [1984] .
A firm in the above-ground economy uses amounts of labor of two
types to equate its MRT to the negative of (wage rate 1 + fringe benefit
' *
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l)/(wage rate 2 + fringe benefit, 2), A firm in the subterranean economy
equates its MRT .to the negative^of the ratio between wage rates. The
two firms have, unequal MRT, and PE conditions are not satisfied
Law Making
• ... - - . ' L . vX. ' . • . • . - "
There exist..a number, iof-ac,tivities in which PE conditions cannot be
known to be satisfied or even be known to exist because their outputs
are not measurable. Consequently we do-not know whether it is-desirable
to satisfy P.E conditions (classical or otherwise) -in pther sectors of
the economy. - One of, these ;activitie8 is law-making. Theory of second
best does not'help,us hire because it..deals with nonsatisfactiqn, not,
nonexistence, of PE conditions. p
Many public policy questions concern imposition or relaxation of
constraints to-achieve public goals." : PE.criteria lare generally not
sufficient -to determine the .efficiency or desirability of-such con
straints because :a PE solution exists in the presence of the constraints
and a different PE solution exists in their, absence. And the two PE
points are not.comparable on Paretian criteria.
This is easily illus.trated by going back to Model MA-1 and first
adding the single restriction < 0and .then-replacing it by the .
restriction H2(X) ,<-0. r-i^The two sets.pf-FOC and ,the SOC will, differ but
each set.provides-a maximum. ^And PE criteria-are insufficient to
identify the preferred' situation. If H^(X) is, effective, '.imposing it .
reduces the,maximum val,ue^_of the^SOT below the value attained in Model
MA-1. Even so, we cannot conclude that imposing Hj^(X), created .
inefficiency or reduced welfare. • Imposing H^.(X) may be the best way-
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that society has of achieving a desirable objective. A restriction that
society chooses to impose upon itself can be viewed in terms of
lexicographic utility. Society may decide that its first goal is to
satisfy Hj^(X) < 0. Only after this goal is met will it seek to
maximize SWF. The » SWF, and H^(x) < 0 all represent persons'
preferences. As economists we are no more competent to judge Hj^(X) than
a (X,) or the SWF.
h h
The laws may not result in mathematical restrictions. They may
spell out public responsibilities in the area of merit goods or in other
ways specify a change in the SWF from W(') to V(*). Certainly we
are not competent to tell society that one SWF is superior to another.
This leads me to conclude that we can never identify a complete, exhaus
tive set of conditions for PE.
Every year we experience substantial expenditures—legal,
political, governmental; on judges, lawyers, expert witnesses, law
clerks, governmental agencies, legislatures, lobbyists, etc.—to deter
mine constraints to be imposed on the system. These constraints can be
in the form of legislative, judicial, or administrative laws. Varia
tions in constraints—imposing, removing, relaxing, tightening—create
situations that are not Pareto comparable. That is, we cannot determine
Pareto efficiency of variations in constraints. Consequently we have no
criteria for determining PE of resources used in determining these con
straints. Likewise we have no criteria for testing PE of use of
resources in political campaigns: where we choose the people who
determine the legal constraints.
The earlier discussion of interpersonal comparisons is relevant
* s
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here because, after all, one essential element of law-making is-the
forming of interpersonal "comparisons. " And this-'leads me to a disquiet-
ing observation: ^congressmen are-more scientific thaii we^economi'st's'
I are. In fonnuiating'laws, they-hbld public'hearings to learn' peoples'
attitudes, preferences i beliefs, and values'." In essence what we do is
to ignore this information that peopie^could provide us'"about'what •they'
are like and we go back to' see what Marshall told'uV people'are'like.
We make the same assumptions about human motivation"that'Marshall made
century ago". The sociologists have provided abundant evidence'that
attitudes, values,'and pre'ferences have chahged,' So we are studying •
people who have been dead for decades'ih our efforts to determine what
will be desirable for people living'in future years; How" can we
possibly know what policies will make" some people'better'off without
making others worse" off unless" we know what"people value? And how can
we know this wheh we never try to find it- out? ' ^ . !
R and D . .
There are a number of activities whose existence i's" hot even
recognized by PE analysis. In his history of General Motors., Alfred '
Sloan [1963, p.' 150] who was'G.M.'' s ""chief executive officer for twenty-
three years and 'a'member'of its board for fo'^rty-five yearswrote' ' ' '
" • "As the economy, lied by the automobile industry, ' '
rose to a new high level in the twenties, a com
plex of new elements' came into existence to trans'—
form the market once again and create the water
shed which" divides the present from the' past'.
These new elements I think I can without signif
icant loss reduce to four: installment selling,
the used car trade-in, the closed body and the
annual model, (l would add improved roads if X " • • ' '
3.
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were to take into account the environment of the
automobile.)"
Many of our .business activities—promotion, advertising, public,
relations, product differentiation—are intended to change consumers'
MRS among products, PE criteria take MRS as given data. How do we
measure the PE of resources used to change things assumed constant in
developing Paretian measures? How can we simultaneously test equality
of constant MRS and compare changes in these MRS with MRT of activities
designed to effect changes in MRS?
Similarly, substantial amounts of resources are devoted Co bringing
about technical change: research and development expenditures. PE
criteria treat MRT in production as parameters. How do we simulta
neously test equality of constant MRT and compare changes in these MRT
with the MRT of activities intended to change them?
All businesses devote resources to procurement and marketing acti
vities: to exchange of ownership. We have neither production nor cost
functions for these activities. Consequently we cannot test the PE of
resources devoted to these activities.
Similar questions can be raised about the information and education
industries.
Until we exercise our omniscience .and develop criteria for deter
mining PE in these legal, advertising, Rand D, and education acti
vities, we cannot know that these activities satisfy the conditions for
PE. So long as we cannot know this, we cannot know that it is desirable
to have PE everywhere else. Having PE everywhere else may be ineffi
cient .
Now suppose that criteria for determining PE of these activities of
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law, advertising', Rand D, and education do not exist. It is an.open
question whether (piecemeal) PE is'desirable, in;other sectors.when it is
not known if PE can even exist in, these ac.tivitiesOneVs answer to the
question is now-a question of.faith and scientific taste, of ,
values. - ' ' •
Public Services -
If no government exists tO'.proyide.-lLfe and. property protection to
the firms in Figure 1, each firm must, set aside some of .its own
resources for its-protection "against fire, theft, and fraud. How much
should it set' aside? - If-a government provides the ,protection, the same
V
question must be asked. Now we have additional PE .conditions.. Theory,
of second best tells'us that .if these conditions are not satisfied ,it is
not desirable to equate MRT.toiMRS elsewhere. We, can not know whether
these conditions are satisfied because we can not measure amount of
protection. Consequently PE criteria for protection do not even exist.
Because they do not exist we.can not. know that it-is desirable to
satisfy PE criteria, for private .goods,. • , ; . - .
The "protection" of-this analysis is an example-pf the many ,
publicly provided.goods: .-fire and, police pro.tection,. national, defense,
court system, law making, international affairs, education, public R and
D, public roads and airports, federal grades and standards: Rausser's
[1982] PERTS —. political economic resource transactions.. If. we allow
protection to be" privately provided, then it is also an. example of
private R and D;. selling,, advertising, and promotion; and, political,
campaigns. Thus we can concl.ude:: --Because there .are large sectors of
64
the economy in which PE can not be known to be satisfied, or even to
exist, we do not know that it is desirable to satisfy PE conditions
(classical or otherwise) in the other sectors of the economy.
Sarauelson's vertical summation of demands does not solve the problem.
His summation requires that output be measurable.
Governments Should Be Inefficient
Some economists seem to be convinced that governments are ineffi
cient. These people should maintain that satisfaction of PE conditions
for private goods is undesirable. Granted, if there is inefficiency in
government we may not know what deviations from PE are desirable else
where. But we do know that some deviation from PE is desirable else
where and that having PE everywhere else is not a second-best situation.
And we know that if we do have Pareto inefficiency elsewhere we may have
a second-best situation.
Some economists maintain that, because governments manage some
things inefficiently—e.g., public lands, public schools, public high-
ways--these things should be owned by private firms • The idea is that
the private firms will manage these things efficiently, I find their
arguments unconvincing. I assume that governments will continue to
perform some services, e.g., law-making and enforcement, international
relation, national defense. So long as governments retain some respons
ibilities, we know that PE elsewhere is not desirable unless government
is PE. And we cannot know that government is PE, One reason is immea
surability of outputs. Another reason concerns military procurement.
According to Tobias et al. [1982, p. 254] the United States has but one
•1
i
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producer..of •some big-iticketj defense items.j. Trident, submarine, aircraft
carriers, tanks,- armo.red personnel carriers. And .seventy percent of all
military procurement is through sole-source contracts or otherwise with-^
out competitive, bidding. Ho,w d'o we assure ourselves that PE exists .in
these bilateral monopolies? '.Ho.w-cati both the Defense, Department^ and the
amis monopolist behave like price'takers? .And we .cannot be sure that
resourtes devoted.to weapons .development are used in a PE manner. -
Given the existence-o.f publ.ic activities whose PE cannot be tested,
then, we cannot know that PE is desirable in management of public lands,
schools, or highways. .'The position that PE-is desirable in these acti
vities is not logically.proven .nor factually established. It is ,a
matter of faith.
But, of course, to argue that these things should be managed
••/'j I ' ' • . _' I
privately and not publicly because only the former assures efficient
management misses a basic point,-one that Bromley [1982] brings out.
Society has' wisely decided, that some resources-allocation decisions are,
too important- to be entrusted, to businessmen., Some things are so much,
more, important to ^society.than what-^economists conventionally call
"efficiency" that their -achievement is worth the,sacrifice of a great
deal of "efficiency".- _ .
Here I am-essentially.restating some of my. earlier arguments.
These economists are able to conclude that private ownership.is superior
to public ownership only because they use an irrelevant SWF; they,
exclude merit wants, universal.hedonism, externalities,in production,,
and sacred value. And-, of course, the fact that private o^roership will
provide a PE outcome does not tell us .that private ownership is desir-
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able. The particular outcome that will eventuate under private owner
ship may be less desirable than the present (presumably non-PE)
situation.
We also need to ask of people who complain that government is inef^r
ficient, How desirable is efficient government? In late 1983, news
papers were reporting on efforts by the Reagan administration to require
the Census Bureau and the Internal Revenue Service to share their data
with other agencies. The Census Bureau and IRS opposed data sharing.
The data-sharing was defended on the basis of efficiency. Other govern
ment agencies would have to make fewer special surveys. C.L. Kincaniion,
deputy director of the Census Bureau, argued that efficiency is not the
primary purpose of government.
TOTAL VS. MARGINAL CONDITIONS
We must distinguish between total and marginal PE conditions. An
economy that satisfies marginal conditions for PE is not maximizing its
efficiency if the available resources and knowledge would permit it to
achieve a higher value of social welfare by replacing some products or
technologies by others, or by reorganizing each centralized corporation
into a decentralized organization, or by reorganizing firms' capital
structures, or by eliminating any of the four methods of competition
that Sloan listed, or by introducing new methods of competition, or by
legislatively abolishing the advertising industry. (What criteria would
you use to judge the desirability of the last action? Abolishing adver
tising is, inter alia, a redefinition of property rights; it limits the
ways in which firms use their resources.)
i A
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UNRELIABILITY OF MEASURES
We have more empirical information on marginal physical products
and marginal rates of substitution in agricultural production than any
where else, -.'And even-here the 'evidence: indicates/that our- estimated
MRT (and consequently our-PE points).'Kave large confidence, intervals:. i •
Doll-, Jebe, and Munson [1960] ^reported standard" errors of. MRS ranging
from 8 to-33% of. the MRT, -In-Fuller's study [1962i, the upper "Limit on
the 95% confidence interval was as much as 66% larger than the lower
limit. These results were obtained under,:the assumption:*.of known
functional form. And that's a highly questionable •assumption, '. Most
production function-studies" find several functional formsi that .are
acceptable on both empirical and theoretical grounds, r' •
MISCELLANEOUS
The assumptions that we use to-.-der.ive -PE measures, as measures of
welfare are inconsistent with the data, .Half or mo_re of,our econometric
tests of hypotheses of homogeneity, .symmetry, negativity, and additivity
of demand functions rej.ect the hypotheses. This, implies -rejection^of
the assumptions .from,..which they are:derived. These rejected assumptions
are the. same ones .that we use to just.ify our interpretation of PE
measures as measures, of well ibeing.. . Ho,w do we justify our continued' use
of measures that "are derived, from rejected, assumptions? . i . •
My work an theory -of cooperative,'•enterprise convinces, me that the
proper "price" :t'o use-for cooperative .transactions.with members is not a
... " .iV. • I ' . ^ "
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price received; the appropriate measure is price received plus expected
patronage refund.
SUMMARY
From our little exercises we identified several conditions under
which classical PE solutions are in fact inefficient.
classical PE solutions, are in fact inefficient.
a. Some persons prefer some" means of attaining their goals over
others,
b. Some firms have limiting resources. .
c. Merit wants exist,
d. Some consumers' utility functions contain other persons'
levels of consumption as argiments,
e. Externalities affect some firms' production functions or.
consumers' utility functions.
f. Some people apply sacred values.
g. There exists concern for equity.
We have also seen that the last five of these conditions require
public intervention in order to achieve PE outcomes. Under these
conditions^ individualistic utility maximizing decisions lead to .
outcomes that systematically differ from PE outcomes." We also found
that the existence of public actions, whose outputs are not. measurable
create the possibility that it is not desirable to have PE outcomes
elsewhere. The existence of merit goods requires that the SWF be
cardinal in its merit good arguments. The surprising result is that PE
outcomes are impossible without government action and perhaps neither
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dfiRirable nor possible in the presence-of government action.
I am also surprised at another result. Earlier.I wrote that one's
answers to the questions "IsPE desirable? Useful? Efficient?" would
depend upon one's values and beliefs. It is my belief- th^t the ..
conditions that make classical PE outcomes inefficient—among them being
merit goods—are common.' The SWF must be cardinal in its merit good,
arguments. Until I am convinced that a cardinal .SOT can even exist, I
will argue that PE outcomes are impossible.of attainment. . -
I believe that economists have^neither the competence, the
responsibility, nor the authority to make interpersonal comparisons and
to base policy studies on our comparisons. I conclude that PE is not a
useful concept because-classical PE outcomes are neither desirable nor
useful but they are'the only PE conditions that can possibly be opera
tional. To operationalize the optimality,conditions of, the various
models in'this paper, one must measure utility functions, transformation
production functionsand values of Lagrange multipliers. See, e-E-.
T.. in SWF, Model MA-2. . . : •
ij - - •
I have also argued that identifying.a particular situation as PE is
not informative because it does not tell society whether the SWF that is
maximized is-a desirable or undesirable SWF., Identifying a hypothetical
policy as PE is not informative either because it does not tell us if
the hypothetical situation makes some,people worse off than under the
status quo; r • ' • :
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